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Abstract—A geometric model of a physical network affected by
a disaster is proposed and analyzed using integral geometry (ge-
ometric probability). This analysis provides a theoretical method
of evaluating performance metrics, such as the probability of
maintaining connectivity, and a network design rule that can
make the network robust against disasters.
The proposed model is of when the disaster area is much
larger than the part of the network in which we are interested.
Performance metrics, such as the probability of maintaining
connectivity, are explicitly given by linear functions of the
perimeter length of convex hulls determined by physical routes.
The derived network design rule includes the following. (1)
Reducing the convex hull of the physical route reduces the
expected number of nodes that cannot connect to the destination.
(2) The probability of maintaining the connectivity of two nodes
on a loop cannot be changed by changing the physical route of
that loop. (3) The effect of introducing a loop is identical to that
of a single physical route implemented by the straight-line route.
Index Terms—Disaster, network survivability, network design,
network architecture, integral geometry, geometric probability,
probability of maintaining connectivity, network availability,
network reliability, network failure.
I. INTRODUCTION
A massive earthquake occurred on March 11, 2011 in
northeastern Japan. The earthquake and the resulting tsunami
destroyed everything including network facilities. According
to the press release from NTT [1], “Facilities were damaged
and commercial power supply was disrupted at exchange of-
fices, among other things, impacting approximately 1.5 million
circuits for fixed-line services, approximately 6,700 pieces of
mobile base-station equipment, approximately 15,000 circuits
for corporate data communication services, and others.” It was
also reported that transmission lines were disconnected in 90
routes, 18 exchange office buildings were destroyed, and 23
buildings were submerged, approximately 65,000 telephone
poles were destroyed, and submersion and physical damage
to aerial cables reached about 6,300 kilometers. Such severe
damage and problems in a network cause secondary negative
effects over a disaster area, for example, emergency calls not
being able to go through.
One may assume that such a huge disaster cannot re-occur in
the future. Unfortunately, this is not the case. A similar level
of damage and destruction in telecommunications networks
due to the earthquake on May 12, 2008 in China was reported
[2]. Minor damage due to disasters can occur anywhere and at
any moment. Therefore, it is important to construct networks
robust against disaster. Higher layer functions are normally
useless when the physical connectivity of fibers is lost or
network node buildings are lost. The physical design, including
the geographical design of the network and its evaluation,
plays a central role.
Through such experiences, network operators have made
efforts to increase network robustness against disasters. For
example, a large earthquake struck in 1968 in northern Japan
triggering the expansion of microwave transit systems as a
means of increasing network survivability and the number
of physical routes because the earthquake disconnected the
network in Hokkaido, the second largest island in Japan,
from the main island of Honshu due to the disconnection
of the submarine cable between the two islands [3]. Another
earthquake in 1993 resulted in the development of a trans-
portable earth station of a satellite communication system
[3]. Nevertheless, we do not have mathematical models or
mathematic frameworks for handling the effects of disasters
striking in an unknown geographical location or area. This
paper responds to the needs of such models or frameworks.
There have been a large number of theoretical papers pub-
lished evaluating the reliability, availability, and survivability
for a given network. However, most of these papers focus on
a single failure (or independent failures) of a network node or
a link. They take into account the topology of the network
rather than its physical shape. For a given set of network
topologies and failure rates of network entities, evaluation of
a metric, such as the probability that a pair of network entities
can be connected, is a typical example [4]. In a disaster, the
assumption of a single or independent failure is not valid.
In addition, the physical shape of a network is important for
evaluating the impact of a disaster on network survivability;
however, most studies have not covered this point.
Several studies of network survivability by taking into
account correlated failure and geometric/geographical condi-
tions have been reported. Grubesic [5] evaluated the network
survivability of the current Internet based on geographical
data. Although he focused on the physical route of a network,
it was a case study, and no mathematical models or methods
were provided. Liew and Lu [6] proposed a framework to
evaluate network survivability during a disaster and intro-
duced a survivability function to various metrics. Although
their framework can introduce correlated failures, they did
2not propose any method or model of correlations, and they
assumed that the independence of failures and the failure rate
was proportional to the link length. Furthermore, they did not
consider the physical shape of the disaster area or that of the
network due to the lack of a mathematical framework. Wu
et al. [8] discussed the optimization of the physical route of
an undersea cable by assuming a disk-shaped disaster area.
By assuming a rectangular route, the length of an edge is
determined by minimizing cost while maintaining a higher
probability of connecting two cities than the threshold.
Taking into account a disaster area, the minimum number of
cuts disconnecting the source and sink nodes was discussed
in the following papers. As far as we know, Bienstock [7]
initiated the study of this problem. Algorithms computing the
minimum number of disaster areas disconnecting the source
and sink nodes were investigated when all the edges intersect-
ing the disaster areas are removed. Sen et al. [9] proposed
a region-based connectivity as a metric for fault-tolerance.
Assuming the region is a disk-shaped disaster area, polynomial
time algorithms calculating region-based connectivity are pro-
vided. Neumayer et al. [10] discussed the geographical min-
cut, defined as the minimum number of disk-shaped disaster
areas to disconnect a pair of nodes, and the geographical
max-flow, defined as the maximum number of paths that are
not disconnected by a single disaster area, and showed that
geographical min-cut is not equal to geographical max-flow.
Agarwal et al. studied algorithms that find a disaster location
having the highest expected impact on a network, where the
impact is defined by various metrics such as the number of
failed components [11].
Recently, Neumayer et al. published two papers intended
to cover network survivability in a disaster [12], [13]. In one
of their introductions [12], they stated that, “we are the first
to attempt to study this problem.” In their network model,
there is a set of line segments of which end points are
locations of network center buildings and the disaster model
is a line segment or a circle [12]. They proposed to use an
optimization technique to find the worst case disaster. On
the other hand, Neumayer and Modiano [13] used geometric
probability (integral geometry) to model the randomness of a
disaster. Their network model is, again, a set of line segments
of which end points are locations of network center buildings
and the disaster model is a line. These papers also emphasize
a polynomial order algorithm to evaluate metrics.
Forecasting the time, even the location and size of a
disaster, is often difficult. For example, although research
on earthquakes in Japan is quite extensive, the size of a
disaster area caused by the earthquake on March 11, 2011
was far beyond expectations. Towns that were expected to
be free from tsunami were engulfed and districts that had
never experienced a strong earthquake were affected by in-
tense shaking. This shows that the frequency of disasters is
too low to make an accurate disaster area model based on
statistics. There are also many types of disasters, such as earth-
quakes, tsunami, hurricanes, landslides, wild fires, tornados,
extraordinarily heavy snowfall, and electromagnetic pulses.
Furthermore, network operators have many subnetworks such
as subscriber and regional networks. There are too many
combinations of disaster and subnetworks to evaluate all cases
individually. Therefore, it is beneficial for network operators
to use a method for assessing network survivability applicable
to generic subnetworks without specific disaster information
and to provide a rule of thumb for designing robust networks.
Based on this motivation, a disaster area is modeled as an
area randomly placed around a network. With extensive use
of integral geometry (geometric probability), more generic
network models than those used by Neumayer and Modiano
[13] can be covered and explicit formulas for performance
metrics, such as the probability that a pair of nodes still
maintain connections, can be derived. The analyzed results
lead us to a network design that can improve robustness against
a disaster.
Integral geometry (geometric probability) used in this paper
is a mathematical method for evaluating the measures that
a certain set (normally a subset of a plane) satisfies certain
characteristics and has been used in several papers regarding
sensor networks as well as that by Neumayer and Modiano
[13]. For example, a series of papers [14], [15], [16], based
on analysis using integral geometry, proposed shape estimation
methods for a target object based on reports from sensor
nodes of unknown locations. Lazos et al. [17] and Lazos and
Poovendran [18] directly applied the results of the integral
geometry discussed in Chapter 5 Section 6.7 of [19] to the
analysis of detecting an object moving in a straight line and
to the evaluation of the probability of k-coverage. Kwon and
Shroff [20] also applied integral geometry to the analysis of
straight-line routing, which is an approximation of the shortest
path routing, and Choi and Das [21] used it to determine
sensors in energy-conserving data gathering.
The contributions of this paper are as follows. (1) This
paper discusses a theoretical method for evaluating network
survivability metrics, such as connectivity probability, when
the physical network and disaster area shapes are given. The
information on the location of the disaster area is not needed.
(2) This theoretical method explicitly reveals the relationships
between network survivability metrics and physical network
shape, when the disaster area is geographically much larger
than the length between two nodes of interest and its boundary
is macroscopically a line. For example, the probability of con-
nectivity between two nodes connected by a single route is a
linear function of the perimeter length of the convex hull of the
physical route. (3) By using the relationships between network
survivability metrics and physical network shape, principles
useful in designing a physical route of a network are derived.
For example, (i) reducing the convex hull of the physical route
reduces the expected number of nodes disconnected to the
destination; (ii) the probability of maintaining the connectivity
of two nodes on a ring network is insensitive to the physical
route shape of that network; (iii) although the straight-line
route maximizes the connection probability when a single
route is used, the effect of introducing a loop is identical to that
when the straight-line route is not practical. As a result, we can
obtain a physical network shape that is robust against a disaster
and the rule of thumb for designing such a physical network.
(4) The proposed simple model, as disaster area shape, is valid
when the bumps of its boundary are small or the interval of
3two bumps are short compared with the mean distance between
two nodes.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II intro-
duces a basic explanation of integral geometry and geometric
probability and derives a basic theorem for the analysis in
later sections. Section III explains the proposed model. Section
IV discusses the analysis results when the disaster area is
much larger than the area of interest, and Section V discusses
numerical examples. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
To analyze the relationship between the shape of the
network and the effect of a disaster, this section provides
mathematical preliminaries.
A. Introduction of integral geometry and geometric probability
The concept of integral geometry and geometric probability
[19] is introduced as a preliminary for evaluating a disaster
occurring at a random location.
For a bounded set K in 2-dimensional space R2, we can
define the motion-invariant measure of the set of positions
of K satisfying the condition X , where the position of K
is determined by the position of its reference point (x, y)
and by its direction θ formed by a reference line fixed in
K with another reference line fixed to the fixed coordinates.
An example of X is K ∩ K0 6= ∅ for a given K0. By
moving K over a domain satisfying X in the parameter
space of (x, y, θ), we obtain the motion-invariant measure
m(K;X) =
∫
X
dK =
∫
X
dx dy dθ of the set of positions
of K satisfying X . That is, m(K;X) is the area size of the
parameter space of (x, y, θ) satisfying X . This “moving K”
is denoted as dK and called the kinematic density. In fact,
dK = dx dy dθ. That is, “moving K” is “moving (x, y, θ)”.
Consequently, the measure m(K;X) is defined by the size of
the area in which the positions of K satisfy X in the parameter
space of (x, y, θ).
Once we have defined the measures m(K;X) and m(K;Y )
(Y j X), the probability that the position of K satisfying
Y among the position of K satisfying X is defined by the
quotient of measures m(K;Y )/m(K;X). This is called a
geometric probability. That is, the geometric probability is
proportional to the measure m(K;Y ) and is normalized by
m(K;X). In this sense, the measure m(K;Y ) is a non-
normalized probability when the parameters (x, y) and θ of
K move uniformly over the parameter space.
Similarly, we can define the measure of a set of lines.
Consider a line G determined by the angle θ, in which the
direction perpendicular to G makes a fixed angle with the
positive part of the x-axis (−π ≤ θ ≤ π), and by its distance
p from the origin O (0 ≤ p) (Fig. 1). That is, G is specified by
the coordinates (p, θ). By using the coordinates (p, θ) and the
criterion of motion-invariance, the motion-invariant measure
of the set of lines G(p, θ) satisfying X is defined by the
simple integral form m(G;X) =
∫
X
dp dθ [19]. (We can
use another parameterization, but we cannot use this simple
integral form. This is because integral geometry requires the
calculated results to be invariant under the group of motions
in the plane and because another parameterization requires a
complicated form to make m(G;X) motion-invariant.)
p
q
G
H
x
y
O
Fig. 1. Parameterization of line
When we consider a strip B with breadth w, its position
should be parameterized by the position of its midparallel line
and its direction. (The strip is the area between two parallel
lines.) Thus, (p, θ) of the midparallel line can be used for
B. Then, the integral form m(B;X) =
∫
X
dp dθ can also be
used to evaluate the measure m(B;X). A randomly placed
B or a randomly placed G takes the position determined by
the parameters (p, θ) of B or G, which uniformly take values
over the parameter space.
Throughout this paper, any boundary of a set in R2 is
smooth and differentiable except for the finite number of
points.
B. Lemma and theorem
This subsection provides a lemma and a theorem for the
analysis in the following sections. For a bounded area C in
R
2
, a directional G, and a directional B with w, we use the
following notations in the remainder of this paper.
• ∂C: boundary of C,
• |C|: perimeter length of C,
• C: convex hull of C,
• RG: right-half plane (the plane of the right side) of G,
• RB : plane of the right side of and outside B,
• GB: left-side boundary line of B.
(RG and RB are located at the right of line G or strip B
when the direction of G or B is upward.) Note that GB is the
boundary of B ∪RB . That is, RGB = (B ∪RB).
In later sections, C in the following lemma and theorem is,
for example, a route between two nodes. Then, the following
theorem provides a probability that a route intersects a disaster
area.
Lemma 1: Let C be a set in R2. The event {RGB∩C = ∅}
is equivalent to {RGB ∩C = ∅}, and the event {RG∩C = ∅}
is equivalent to {RG ∩ C = ∅}.
This is almost trivial because RGB or RG is a half-plane.
Theorem 1: Let C be a set in R2 and assume that C j A0
where A0 (area of interest) is bounded and convex.
4Then,
Pr(RGB ∩ C = ∅|B ∩ A0 6= ∅) =
|A0| − |C|
2|A0|+ 2πw
. (1)
Proof: First, assume that C is a convex set. Take an origin
in C and consider support functions p0 = p0(θ) > 0 and
q0 = q0(θ) > 0 for C and A0.
In general, a support function for X provides a set of lines,
and each line in the set is called a line of support for X . A
line of support for X is a line containing at least one of X
but such that one of the two open half planes determined by
the line contains no point of X (Fig. 2) [22]. The following
relationship is known between a support function px(θ) for
X and its perimeter length |X |:
∫ pi
−pi
px(θ)dθ = |X | [19]. For
each θ, the distance of a line of support from the origin is
px(θ).
ƉϬTT͛
ǆ
Ǉ
K

T
ƉϬT͛
>ŝŶĞŽĨƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌ
Fig. 2. Support function p0 = p0(θ)
For a fixed θ, the range of p that satisfies RGB ∩ C 6=
∅, B ∩A0 6= ∅ is −q0(θ+ π)−w/2 ≤ p ≤ p0(θ) +w/2 (See
Fig. 3. In this figure, the two strips correspond to the two
positions of B. One position corresponds to p = p0(θ) +w/2
and the other corresponds to p = −q0(θ+π)−w/2. Because
B is directional, we consider −∞ < p < ∞,−π ≤ θ < π.)
Thus,
m(B;RGB ∩ C 6= ∅, B ∩ A0 6= ∅)
=
∫
RGB∩C 6=∅,B∩A0 6=∅
dp dθ
=
∫ pi
−pi
(p0(θ) + q0(θ + π) + w)dθ. (2)
Note that p0 is a support function of C. Thus,
∫ pi
−pi
p0(θ)dθ =
|C|. Similarly,
∫ pi
−pi
q0(θ + π)dθ = |A0|. Therefore,
m(B;RGB ∩C 6= ∅, B ∩ A0 6= ∅) = |C|+ |A0|+ 2πw. (3)
Similarly,
m(B;B ∩ A0 6= ∅) =
∫
B∩A0 6=∅
dp dθ
O
C
Area of interest A0
T
q0 TS
p0 T
B
w
w/2
w/2
Fig. 3. Derivation of m(B;RGB ∩C 6= ∅, B ∩ A0 6= ∅)
=
∫ pi
−pi
q0(θ) + q0(θ + π) + w dθ
= 2|A0|+ 2πw. (4)
According to the definition of geometric probability,
Pr(RGB ∩ C = ∅|B ∩ A0 6= ∅)
= 1− Pr(RGB ∩ C 6= ∅|B ∩ A0 6= ∅)
= 1−
m(B;RGB ∩ C 6= ∅, B ∩ A0 6= ∅)
m(B;B ∩A0 6= ∅)
. (5)
Thus, we obtain Eq. (1).
When C is not a convex set, consider C instead of C. Then,
Pr(RGB∩C = ∅|B∩A0 6= ∅) =
|A0|−|C|
2|A0|+2piw
. By using Lemma
1, we obtain Eq. (1).
III. MODEL
This paper investigates a physical network, such as an
optical fiber network, within a bounded and convex A0. This
A0 is the area of interest, and disasters causing damage in part
of A0 are taken into account.
Let ni (i = 1, 2, · · ·) be the nodes in the network, and let
l(i, j) be the physical link between two consecutive nodes ni
and nj . When there are N(i, j) routes between nodes ni and
nj , let sk(i, j) be its k-th physical route. The route sk(i, j) is a
concatenation of physical links. For example, sk(i, j) consists
of l(i, k1), l(k1, k2), l(k2, j) when there are intermediate nodes
nk1 , nk2 on the route between ni and nj . When there are no
intermediate nodes between ni and nj , sk(i, j) = l(i, j). Path
configuration p(i, j) is defined as a union of the routes between
ni and nj . That is, p(i, j) ≡ ∪N(i,j)k=1 sk(i, j).
In this paper, the meaning of sk(i, j) and p(i, j) is not
limited to the connectivity between ni and nj . The meaning
of sk(i, j) and p(i, j) implies the physical route shape and
its union between ni and nj . Therefore, we can define, for
example, p(i, j), which is the convex hull of p(i, j).
When p(i, j) consists of a single route, that is, when
N(i, j) = 1 and p(i, j) = s1(i, j), we may call p(i, j) a
single route path. When we call p(i, j) a ring-type network,
this means that there are two non-overlapping routes between
5ni and nj . For a ring-type network, it is assumed that there is
connectivity between two nodes if at least a clockwise or coun-
terclockwise route between these two nodes is maintained.
For a ring-type network, it is assumed that the area of which
boundary is p(i, j) is convex for the remainder of this paper.
(For simplicity, we denote “p(i, j) is convex” in the remainder
of this paper. However, it formally means that the area of
which boundary is p(i, j) is convex.)
A network affected by a disaster is analyzed. With no prior
information of the disaster, the disaster area D is modeled as
a randomly placed area around a network in R2. The disaster
area D is modeled as a realization of a spatially stationary
process.
It is assumed that the portion of the network included in D
does not work at all. That is, no network elements function in
D.
In the remainder of this paper, it is assumed that a disaster
area D ⊂ R2 is geographically much larger than the length
between two nodes of interest. For example, the disaster area
of a large earthquake is at least hundreds of km2. Some may
reach tens of thousands of km2. A large hurricane can create
a disaster area larger than a hundred km2. Therefore, this
assumption is useful, for example, for evaluating a disaster
affecting a small subnetwork, such as a subscriber network,
or for designing a robust physical route of such a network
against disasters. Because D is very large, we can assume that
its boundary area is macroscopically a line but microscopically
has bumps. The proposed model is a strip B with a half-plane
RB . That is, B is a model in which the boundary is rugged
within breadth w (Fig. 4).
For a directional B, D is assumed to be RGB , that is D ≈
RGB . Because we assume that a part of the network in RGB
does not work at all, this model is identical to that in which the
boundary of D is a line GB . This assumption underestimates
the probabilities of connectivities under the assumption that
a part of the network in D does not work at all. However,
as a network operator, this safe-side assumption is adopted to
obtain a feasible rule of thumb. To show the validity of this
model of D, we discuss the simulation results in Section V.
Z
 w
Actual boundary of disaster area
'
Fig. 4. Strip model
The following is a list of notations used in the remainder
of this paper.
• i↔ j means that there is connectivity between nodes ni
and nj ,
• i 6↔ j means that the connectivity is lost between ni and
nj , and
• (ni, nj) means a straight-line segment of which the two
end points are ni and nj (this is equivalent to the convex
hull of ni and nj).
Sometimes, for example, i↔ k↔ j is used. This means that
i↔ k and k ↔ j.
IV. ANALYSIS
In the rest of this section, cases in which B ∩ A0 6= ∅ are
of focus. To simplify the notation, the description for this area
of focus is omitted in the remainder of the paper.
[Remark 1] This area of focus means that disasters causing
damage in part of A0 are taken into account but disasters
that affect the entire A0 are removed. If those disasters
affecting the entire A0 are taken into account, the measure of
{A0∩RGB 6= ∅} is required. However, this measure becomes
infinite because RGB is a half plane. As a result, Pr(i ↔ j)
cannot be appropriately determined. Because of this technical
reason, the cases in which B∩A0 6= ∅ are of focus. However,
even under this focus, the cases in which a subnetwork of
interest is completely included in RGB can be considered.
By appropriately setting A0, there are no practical problems
caused by this focus.
[Remark 2] The results in this paper are also valid when D
is a strip B′ with breadth W (W ≫ w,W > dmax) and D
satisfying B′∩A0 6= ∅ is the disaster we take into account (Fig.
5). Here dmax is the maximum distance between two points in
a physical path configuration. In this case, the numerator of all
the results in this section are replaced with m(B′;B′ ∩A0 6=
∅) = 2|A0|+2πW . If we believe that removing disasters that
affect the entire A0 is unnatural, this wide-strip model can
be used because we can take into account disasters causing
damage in part of A0 as well as those damaging the entire
A0. However, the wide-strip model makes the proofs of the
results less comprehensive than with the original model.
This validity, even under the wide strip model, is due to the
equivalence of two events. The first one is that a part of the
path configuration is in RGB′ and the other one is that this
part is in B′. This equivalence is proven as follows. Because
B′ j RGB′ , if a part of the path configuration is in B
′
, then
it is in RGB′ . If a part Φ of the path configuration is in RGB′
and a point x ∈ Φ is outside B′, the distance between x and
a point outside Φ on this path configuration is larger than W .
This contradicts the assumption that dmax < W . Therefore, if
a part of the path configuration is in RGB′ , then it is included
in B′.
:
Z
GPD[
3DWKFRQILJXUDWLRQ
Fig. 5. Wide strip model
6A. Single route path
Result 1: When p(i, j) consists of a single route, the
probability Pr(i ↔ j) that there is connectivity between ni
and nj is given by
Pr(i↔ j) =
|A0| − |p(i, j)|
2|A0|+ 2πw
. (6)
Proof: The event i↔ j is equivalent to the event that any
part of p(i, j) is not in RGB . Apply Eq. (1) to C = p(i, j)
and obtain Eq. (6).
Surprisingly, Pr(i ↔ j) can be given by a simple explicit
function of p(i, j), and is determined only by |p(i, j)|. That
is, for fixed |p(i, j)|, Pr(i↔ j) is not dependent on the length
of p(i, j) or the size of p(i, j).
The result mentioned above tells us the following. First, if
there is an intermediate node nk between ni and nj (Fig. 6),
Pr(i↔ k)− Pr(i↔ j) is proportional to |p(i, j)| − |p(i, k)|.
That is, the decrease in the probability of maintaining connec-
tivity due to the increase in the number of hops is proportional
to the increase in the perimeter length of the convex hull of
the route. Therefore, if the increase in the perimeter length
of the convex hull of the route is not large, the decrease
in the probability of maintaining connectivity due to the
increase in the number of hops is not large. For example,
Pr(i↔ k)−Pr(i↔ j) is larger in Fig. 6-(a) than in Fig. 6-(b)
because the increase in the perimeter length of the convex hull
of the route is larger in the former than in the latter. Second,
Pr(i↔ j) is smaller as |p(i, j)| increases. Hence, it is likely
that Pr(i ↔ j) is smaller if ni and nj are far away or the
route between them is more non-roundabout (Fig. 6-(a)) than
roundabout (Fig. 6-(b)) for fixed route length. Third, among
all i, j pairs, Pr(i ↔ j) becomes worse for the i, j pair of
which |p(i, j)| is the largest.
Ŭ
ũŝ
Ɖ;ŝ͕ũͿ
Ɖ;ŝ͕ũͿ
;ĂͿ
Ɖ;ŝ͕ũͿ
;ďͿ
Ŭ
ũŝ
Ɖ;ŝ͕ũͿ
Fig. 6. Pr(i↔ j) for single route
Equation (6) can provide Pr(i ↔ k ↔ j) by replacing
p(i, j) with p(i, k) ∪ p(k, j) if p(i, k) and p(k, j) are single
route paths. Particularly when nk ∈ p(i, j), p(i, j) = p(i, k)∪
p(k, j).
Result 2: Between ni and nj , there is a single route for j =
j1, j2, · · ·. Let Pa be the probability that there is connectivity
between ni and all these nodes nj1 , nj2 , · · ·. Then,
Pa =
|A0| − |∪j=j1,j2,···p(i, j)|
2|A0|+ 2πw
. (7)
Proof: The event ∩j=j1,j2,···{i ↔ j} is equivalent to
(∪j=j1,j2,···p(i, j)) ∩ RGB = ∅. According to Eq. (1), we
obtain Eq. (7).
It is likely that |∪j=j1,j2,···p(i, j)| is large when a network
covers a physically wide area. Thus, it is difficult to maintain
the connectivity of the entire network during a disaster if the
network covers a physically wide area. The difference in Pa
for a small network and that for a large network is proportional
to the difference in |∪j=j1,j2,···p(i, j)| for these two networks.
B. Ring-type network
Result 3: Assume that p(i, j) is a ring-type network. Nodes
ni and nj are connected if at least one clockwise route or
counterclockwise route of this network is maintained. Then,
{ni ↔ nj} if and only if {(ni, nj) ∩ RGB = ∅}, and its
probability is given as follows.
Pr(i↔ j) =
|A0| − |(ni, nj)|
2|A0|+ 2πw
. (8)
This probability does not increase even if additional routes are
provided between nodes on this ring-type network (Fig. 7).
i j
Ring-type network
j
j
j
Additional routes
j
j
Fig. 7. Higher connectivity by additional routes
Proof: First, assume that p(i, j) is a ring-type network.
That is, no additional routes are assumed to be provided. If
{i 6↔ j}, (i) ni and nj are in RGB , (ii) either ni or nj is in
RGB , or (iii) neither ni nor nj is in RGB , but there exist a
link in RGB on the clockwise route and another link in RGB
on the counter-clockwise route. Due to the assumption of the
convexity of p(i, j) and the fact that RGB is a half plane, case
(iii) does not occur. It is also clear that {(ni, nj)∩RGB 6= ∅}
for cases (i) and (ii). Thus, {i 6↔ j} ⇒ {(ni, nj)∩RGB 6= ∅}.
Equivalently, {(ni, nj) ∩RGB = ∅} ⇒ {i↔ j}.
Conversely, if {(ni, nj) ∩ RGB 6= ∅}, {(ni, nj) ⊂ RGB}
or {(ni, nj) ∩ GB 6= ∅}. Note {(ni, nj) ⊂ RGB} means that
{i 6↔ j}. In addition, {(ni, nj)∩GB 6= ∅} means that either ni
or nj is in RGB and {i 6↔ j}. Therefore, {(ni, nj) ∩RGB 6=
∅} ⇒ {i 6↔ j}. Consequently, {i↔ j} ⇒ {(ni, nj)∩RGB =
∅}.
Hence, {i↔ j} if and only if {(ni, nj) ∩RGB = ∅}.
According to Eq. (1) with C = (ni, nj), Pr(i ↔ j) =
|A0|−|(ni,nj)|
2|A0|+2piw
.
Second, assume that additional routes are provided. It is
almost clear that additional routes do not increase Pr(ni ↔
nj). If i 6↔ j without additional routes, at least one of ni, nj is
7in RGB . This is because case (iii) does not occur, as mentioned
above. Therefore, no additional routes increase Pr(ni ↔ nj),
because at least one of ni, nj is in RGB .
Equation (8) tells us that we cannot change Pr(i ↔ j) by
changing the physical route of the ring-type network for fixed
locations of ni and nj . This is because the right-hand side of
Eq. (8) does not depend on p(i, j).
Comparing Eq. (8) with Eq. (6), we find that the effect
of the clockwise and counterclockwise routes on Pr(i ↔ j)
for a ring-type network is equal to the replacement of the
ring-type p(i, j) with the single straight-line-segment physical
route between ni and nj . This is actually intuitive. Due to the
convexity of the ring-type network p(i, j) and the fact that the
boundary of the disaster area model RGB is a line, the event
that the ring-type network p(i, j) intersects RGB is identical
to the event that the straight-line segment between ni and nj
intersects RGB (Fig. 8).
ŝ ũ
^ƚƌĂŝŐŚƚůŝŶĞ
ƐĞŐŵĞŶƚƌŽƵƚĞ
ZŝŶŐͲƚǇƉĞŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ
Fig. 8. Ring-type network intersecting D = RGB
C. Combination of single route path and ring-type network
An actual network is not as simple as a tree or a ring, and
uses mechanisms to improve the availability of the network.
In this subsection, the results on more practical situations are
discussed.
The latter part of the following result is useful to evaluate
cases in which nk is equipped with a higher-layer switch or a
server.
Result 4: Assume that path configuration p(i, j) between
ni and nj consists of two parts: the first part p(i, k) between
ni and nk is a single route path, and the second part p(k, j)
between nk and nj is a ring-type network where p(k, j) is
convex (Fig. 9-(a)). The probability Pr(i ↔ j) that there is
connectivity between ni and nj is given by
Pr(i↔ j) =
|A0| − |p(i, k) ∪ nj |
2|A0|+ 2πw
. (9)
Assume that path configuration p(i, j) between ni and nj
consists of four parts: the first part p(i, k1) between ni and
nk1 and the fourth part p(k2, j) between nk2 and nj are
single route paths, and the second and third parts p(k1, k)
and p(k, k2) are convex ring-type networks on the same ring
network (Fig. 9-(b)). The probability Pr(i↔ j) is given by
Pr(i↔ j) =
|A0| − |p(i, k1) ∪ nk ∪ p(k2, j)|
2|A0|+ 2πw
(10)
Proof: The event {i↔ j} is equivalent to the joint event
of {i ↔ k} and {k ↔ j} for case (a). The event {i ↔ k} is
equivalent to {p(i, k) ∩ RGB = ∅}. Due to the definition of
the convex hull, this is equivalent to {p(i, k)∩RGB = ∅}. The
event {k↔ j} is equivalent to {(nk, nj)∩RGB = ∅} because
of Result 3. Note that {p(i, k)∩RGB = ∅}∩{(nk, nj)∩RGB =
∅} is equivalent to {p(i, k) ∪ nj∩RGB = ∅}. By applying Eq.
(1), we obtain Eq. (9).
The event i↔ k1 ↔ k ↔ k2 ↔ j is equivalent to the event
{p(i, k1) ∩RGB = ∅} ∩ {k1 ↔ k} ∩ {k ↔ k2} ∩ {p(k2, j) ∩
RGB = ∅}. According to Result 3, {k1 ↔ k} is equivalent
to {(nk1 , nk) ∩ RGB = ∅}. That is, i ↔ k1 ↔ k ↔ k2 ↔ j
is equivalent to {p(i, k1)∪ p(j, k2)∪ (nk1 , nk)∪ (nk, nk2)} ∩
RGB = ∅. According to Eq. (1), we obtain Eq. (10).
k 
j 
i 
p(i,k) 
p(i,k) U nj 
p(k,j) 
(a) 
k1 
j 
i 
p(i,k1) 
p(i,k1) U nk U p(k2,k) 
p(k1,k) 
k2 
(b) 
k p(k2,j) 
p(k,k2) 
Fig. 9. Pr(i↔ j) for combination of single route path and ring-type network
Result 5: Assume that path configuration p(i, j) between
ni and nj consists of two parts: the first part p(i, k(j)) is a
ring-type network between ni and nk(j), and the second part
p(k(j), j) is a single route for j = j1, j2, · · ·. Let Pa be the
probability that there is connectivity between ni and all of
these nodes nj1 , nj2 , · · ·. Then,
Pa =
|A0| − |∪j=j1,j2,···p(k(j), j) ∪ ni|
2|A0|+ 2πw
, (11)
Proof: The event ∩j=j1,j2,···{i ↔ j} is equiva-
lent to (∪j=j1,j2,···p(k(j), j) ∪ (k(j), i)) ∩ RGB = ∅.
By using Eq. (1) and ∪j=j1 ,j2,···p(k(j), j) ∪ (k(j), i) =
∪j=j1,j2,···p(k(j), j) ∪ ni, we obtain Eq. (11).
How using a backup node nj2 improves the probability of
maintaining connectivity is now discussed.
Result 6: Assume that there are two nodes nj1 and nj2 on
a ring network. The path configurations p(i, j1) and p(i, j2)
consist of two parts: the first part (p(i, k)) is a single route
path, and the second part (p(k, j1) or p(k, j2)) is a ring-type
network. The path configurations p(k, j1) and p(k, j2) form
the same convex ring-type network. The probability Pr(i ↔
j1 or j2) that there is connectivity between ni and at least one
of nj1 and nj2 is given by
Pr(i↔ j1 or j2)
=
1
2|A0|+ 2πw
{|A0| − |p(i, k) ∪ nj1 | − |p(i, k) ∪ nj2 |
+|p(i, k) ∪ nj1 ∪ nj2 |}. (12)
8Assume that there are nodes nj1 , nj2 , nj3 , · · · , nk on a ring
network and that nj1 and nj2 are the nearest destination nodes
on the clockwise route and counterclockwise route on the ring
network from ni, respectively (Fig. 10). Then,
Pr(i↔ j1, j2, · · · , or jk) = Pr(i↔ j1 or j2). (13)
ũϭ
ŝ
ũϮ ũϯ
ũϰ
Fig. 10. Pr(i↔ j1, j2, · · · , or jk)
Proof: The event that there is connectivity between ni
and one of nj1 and nj2 is equivalent to the event {(p(i, k) ∪
(nk, nj1))∩RGB = ∅} or {(p(i, k)∪ (nk, nj2))∩RGB = ∅}.
To evaluate the measure of this event, we need to divide
it into two subevents and remove the overlap: the first
subevent is {(p(i, k)∪ (nk, nj1))∩RGB = ∅} and the second
subevent is {(p(i, k) ∪ (nk, nj2)) ∩RGB = ∅}. Because their
overlap is {(p(i, k) ∪ (nk, nj1) ∪ (nk, nj2)) ∩ RGB = ∅},
m(B; i ↔ j1 or j2) = m(B; (p(i, k) ∪ (nk, nj1)) ∩ RGB =
∅)+m(B; (p(i, k)∪ (nk, nj2))∩RGB = ∅)−m(B; (p(i, k)∪
(nk, nj1) ∪ (nk, nj2))} ∩ RGB = ∅. Similar to Eq. (1), we
obtain Eq. (12).
If there is connectivity between ni and one of nodes
nj3 , nj4 , · · ·, there is connectivity between ni and at least nj1
and nj2 . Therefore, Eq. (13) is valid.
Equation (12) tells us that the effect of a backup
node on Pr(i ↔ j1 or j2) is {−|p(i, k) ∪ nj2 | +
|p(i, k) ∪ nj1 ∪ nj2 |}/(2|A0| + 2πw). This effect is numeri-
cally evaluated with numerical examples discussed in a later
section. Equation (13) shows that more than two backup nodes
are meaningless for a given i.
The following result is an extension of the latter part of
Result 4. That is, it covers cases in which a higher layer switch
or a server at nk1 has a backup nk2 .
Result 7: Assume that there are two nodes nk1 and nk2 on
a ring network. To connect between ni and nj , one of them
must be connected. The path configuration p(i, j) consists of
three parts (Fig. 11): the first and third parts p(i, i0) p(j0, j)
are single route paths, and the second part p(i0, j0) is a
little bit complicated. When nk1 (nk2) is used, the second
part p(i0, j0) consists of two ring-type networks p(i0, k1) and
p(k1, j0) (p(i0, k2) and p(k2, j0)). The probability that there
is connectivity between ni and nj through either nk1 or nk2
is given as follows.
Pr(i↔ i0 ↔ (k1 or k2)↔ j0 ↔ j)
=
1
2|A0|+ 2πw
{|A0| − |p(i, i0) ∪ p(j, j0) ∪ nk1 |
−|p(i, i0) ∪ p(j, j0) ∪ nk2 |
+|p(i, i0) ∪ p(j, j0) ∪ nk1 ∪ nk2 |} (14)
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Fig. 11. Pr(i↔ j) through either nk1 or nk2
Proof: The event in which there is connectivity between
ni and nj through either nk1 or nk2 is equivalent to {i ↔
i0 ↔ (k1 or k2) ↔ j0 ↔ j}. To evaluate the measure of
this event, divide this event into two subevents and remove
the overlap: the first subevent is {i ↔ i0 ↔ k1 ↔ j0 ↔ j}
and the second subevent is {i ↔ i0 ↔ k2 ↔ j0 ↔ j}. The
measures of these two subevents are given by the numerator
of Eq. (10). The overlap is {i↔ i0 ↔ k1 ↔ j0 ↔ j} ∩ {i↔
i0 ↔ k2 ↔ j0 ↔ j}. This is identical to {(p(i, i0)∪p(j, j0)∪
nk1 ∪nk2)∩RGB = ∅. Therefore, the measure of this overlap
is (|A0| − |p(i, i0) ∪ p(j, j0) ∪ nk1 ∪ nk2 |). As a result, we
obtain Eq. (14).
We learn that the effect of a backup node on the probability
that there is connectivity between ni and nj through at least
one nk1 or nk2 is quite similar to that on Pr(i ↔ j1 or j2).
Replacing a single route path p(i, k) in Eq. (12) with the union
of two single route paths p(i, i0) ∪ p(j, j0) gives us Eq. (14).
D. Number of nodes losing connectivity
Let us discuss how we minimize the expected number of
subscribers or nodes losing connectivity.
Result 8: Let S be a set of nodes and ♯(i 6↔ S) be the
number of nodes in S disconnected from ni. If p(i, j) is a
single route path for nj ∈ S,
E[♯(i 6↔ S)] =
∑
nj∈S
(|A0|+ |p(i, j)|+ 2πw)
2|A0|+ 2πw
.
(15)
If p(i, j) is a ring-type network for nj ∈ S,
E[♯(i 6↔ S)] =
∑
nj∈S
(|A0|+ |(ni, nj)|+ 2πw)
2|A0|+ 2πw
.
(16)
Proof: Note that E[♯(i 6↔ S)] = ∑nj∈S E[1(i 6↔ j)] =∑
nj∈S
Pr(i 6↔ j) where 1(x) =
{
1, if x is true,
0, otherwise. Then,
we obtain Eq. (15) through Eq. (6). Similarly, we can obtain
Eq. (16) by using Eq. (8).
Therefore, to reduce E[♯(i 6↔ S)], reduction of
∑
j |p(i, j)|
is necessary for a single route. Thus, its physical route that
minimizes E[♯(i 6↔ S)] is identical to every p(i, j) being on
a straight line when the locations of the nodes are fixed. In
9practice, because there are many constraints, such as alignment
with the road and minimizing cost (including minimizing the
total length of the cable and maximizing the number of fibers
in use in a cable) in determining the physical route, the
straight-line route is difficult. By choosing the physical route
that minimizes |p(i, j)| among the feasible routes, however, we
can reduce E[♯(i 6↔ S)]. In particular, even when the length of
the route is the same, we can reduce |p(i, j)| and, as a result,
E[♯(i 6↔ S)]. Figure 12 shows such an example. The lengths
of Routes 1 and 2 are the same, but the perimeter length of
the convex hull of Route 1 is shorter than that of Route 2.
Route 1 
Route 2 
i 
䌪 
Fig. 12. Example of reducing E[♯(i 6↔ S)] with same route length
A very good point of Eq. (15) is that we can reduce
E[♯(i 6↔ S)] by reducing |p(i, j)| independently of the
path configuration of other source-destination pairs. Hence,
reducing |p(i, j)| (as a result, reducing E[♯(i 6↔ S)]) can be
implemented easily without burden of computation.
On the other hand, as described just after Result 3, E[♯(i 6↔
S)] does not depend on the physical route if the locations of
ni and nj are fixed and p(i, j) is a ring-type network. Thus,
we cannot reduce E[♯(i 6↔ S)] by changing the physical route.
Although the above result does not refer to other types of
path configuration other than a single route path or a ring-type
network, it is trivial that we can obtain E[♯(i 6↔ S)] if we
know Pr(i 6↔ j) because E[♯(i 6↔ S)] =
∑
nj∈S
Pr(i 6↔ j).
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In the following numerical examples, w = 0 is assumed for
any case if not explicitly indicated otherwise. This is because
we can easily obtain the probability connecting two nodes for
w > 0 by |A0||A0|+2piw× (the probability connecting two nodes
for w = 0).
A. Subscriber network
By using Eq. (6), Pr(i ↔ lc ↔ j) is evaluated for the
network model shown in Fig. 13-(a). Here, lc is a local network
center providing a local switch to connect two subscribers in
this subscriber network, and is located at the bottom-left corner
in this figure. In addition, Pr(i ↔ lc ↔ j) can be evaluated
for the network model shown in Fig. 13-(b) by using Eq. (10).
It can also evaluated for the real subscriber network shown in
Fig. 14.
(a) Tree model (b) Loop model
Local network center
A_0
Local network center
A_0
Fig. 13. Subscriber network models
Fig. 14. Example of real subscriber network
Figures 15 and 16 plot Pr(i ↔ lc ↔ j) after sorting them
in descending order of their exact values. In these figures,
“Exact” is given by Eq. (6) for (a) and by Eq. (10) for (b),
“Independent approx.” is given by Pr(i ↔ lc) Pr(j ↔ lc),
each of which is derived by Eq. (6) for (a) and by Eq. (9) for
(b), “Line approx.” is given by Eq. (6) under the assumption
that the physical route between ni and nj is given by a
straight line (a flybird connection [23], [24], so to speak), and
“Independent line approx.” is given by Pr(i↔ lc) Pr(j ↔ lc)
under the assumption that the physical route between ni (nj)
and lc is given by a straight line. A simulation was conducted
assuming that D = RGB to confirm the verification of “Exact.”
Because the simulation results were in very good agreement
with “Exact”, we cannot see “Exact” overlapping with the
simulation results. (The average sizes of the 95% confidence
intervals of the simulation are 0.0182, 0.0183, and 0.0190 for
the network shown in Figs. 13-(a), (b), and 14.)
As expected, the independent approximation underestimates
and the line approximation overestimates Pr(i ↔ lc ↔ j).
This is because the independent approximation ignores the
correlations that the two routes (between ni and lc and
between nj and lc) are damaged simultaneously and because
the line approximation ignores the fact that the actual physical
route is longer than the straight-line route. Independent line
approximation is almost similar to independent approximation.
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Line approximation shows us the minimum Pr(i ↔ lc ↔ j)
by changing the physical route. Its effect is not so large
in this figure. In addition, the effect of the introduction of
the local loop can be evaluated by the difference between
Pr(i ↔ lc ↔ j) under (a) the tree model and that under
(b) the loop model for each pair of i and j. Of course, the
difference is always non-negative, but it is very small in this
example. It is less than three percent (its relative value is less
than ten percent) for any pair of i and j, and it is less than one
percent on average (its relative value is less than two percent
on average).
(a) Tree model 
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Fig. 15. Pr(i↔ lc ↔ j) for subscriber network models
Fig. 16. Pr(i↔ lc ↔ j) for real subscriber network
B. Effect of backup node
Based on Eqs. (9) and (12), we evaluated the effect of a
backup node for the model shown in Fig. 17. A regional
network center rc is located on a ring network, which is a
circle with radius rl. The angle formed by the line segment
between rc and the center O of the ring network and the
reference line is α1. When the other regional network center
r′c as a backup is provided, the angle of the line passing O
and r′c and the reference line is α2. There are multiple nodes
n1, n2, · · · on the same ring network, where the angle between
two consecutive nodes is γ. Let S be the set of these nodes.
Similar to derivation of Eq. (15), E1 ≡ E[♯(rc 6↔ S)] =∑
nj∈S
(1 − Pr(rc ↔ j)) and E2 ≡ E[♯(rc or r′c 6↔ S)] =∑
nj∈S
(1− Pr(rc or r′c ↔ j)). Because Pr(rc ↔ j) is given
by Eq. (9) with rc = i = k and Pr(rc or r′c ↔ j)) is given
by Eq. (12) with j = i = k and rc = j1, r′c = j2, we can
numerically minimize E1 by changing the location of rc and
E2 by changing the locations of rc and r′c.
K
DϮ
J
ϭ
Dϭ
Ϯ
ϯ
J
Fig. 17. Model of two regional network centers
E1∗ and E2∗, which are minimized E1 and E2, are
plotted in Figure 18. In this figure, (i) as the number of
nodes increases, E1∗ − E2∗ almost linearly increases, and
(ii) as rl increases, E1∗ − E2∗ slightly increases. Therefore,
for a network with many nodes or for a physically large
network, we need to provide a backup node. Although it can
be determined whether the effect of a backup node is large
because E1∗−E2∗ and E1∗/E2∗ depends on |A0|, the backup
node does not seem able to drastically reduce the number of
nodes disconnected from a regional network center.
C. Validity of strip model
The boundary area of a disaster area D is assumed to be a
strip B in the numerical examples in this section when D is
much larger than the distance between two nodes of interest.
This assumption may be valid in a macroscopic view, but it
is not likely in a microscopic view.
To evaluate the impact of the micro shape of the boundary,
a simulation was conducted that uses a sine wave as the
boundary of D. Figure 19 plots the mean relative abso-
lute error
∑
i6=j e(i, j)/
∑
i6=j 1 for two cases (tree model
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in Fig. (13) and real subscriber network shown in Fig.
14), where e(i, j) is the relative absolute error defined by
e(i, j) ≡ |psimulation(i, j)−ptheory(i, j)|/ptheory(i, j). Here,
ptheory(i, j) is Pr(i ↔ lc ↔ j) obtained by Eq. (6), and
psimulation(i, j) is that obtained by simulation when the sine
wave with amplitude w/2 and wavelength λ is used as the
boundary. The unit length of this graph is the mean distance
between two individual subscribers. The two graphs in Fig. 19
look similar. Therefore, the characteristics shown here seem
valid for many cases. (i) If λ / 0.5 or w < 1, the strip
model is valid. That is, the strip model can cover the boundary
bump occurring in a period shorter than half the mean distance
between two individual nodes or bumps smaller than half the
mean distance between two individual nodes. We can ignore
the variation in the boundary smaller than or within an interval
shorter than half the mean distance between two individual
nodes. (ii) The relative absolute error rapidly becomes large
when w ' 1 and λ ' 0.5. Therefore, if variations in the
boundary satisfy w ' 1 and λ ' 0.5, we need the model to
take into account this variation.
VI. CONCLUSION
One geometric model was proposed for evaluating the
impact of a disaster on a network and was analyzed through
integral geometry (geometric probability). The validity of
this model was evaluated through simulation. The simulation
results show that the proposed model is valid when the bumps
are small or the interval of two bumps are short compared
with the mean distance between two nodes.
Performance metrics were derived, such as the probability
of maintaining connection between two nodes, as explicit
functions of physical route shape. They are linear functions
of perimeter lengths of convex hulls determined by physical
route shape.
The results showed the following rules of thumb for design-
ing a network robust against disasters when the disaster area
is much larger than the (sub)network of interest: (1) Reducing
the convex hull of the path configuration reduces the expected
number of nodes that cannot connect to the destination. (2)
For two given nodes ni, nj on a ring-type network, Pr(i↔ j)
is independent of the physical route of the ring-type network.
That is, we cannot change Pr(i↔ j) by changing the physical
(b) Real subscriber network 
(a) Tree model of subscriber network 
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Fig. 19. Relative absolute error of Pr(i ↔ lc ↔ j) under sine wave
boundary of disaster
route. (3) When a single route is provided between two nodes,
the straight-line route maximizes the probability maintaining
the connectivity between them irrespective of the disaster area.
When it is difficult to adopt the straight-line route, the effect
of introducing a loop is identical to that.
It is assumed that a disaster area can be modeled by an area
randomly placed around a network. This assumption is based
on the consideration that we cannot forecast the locations or
shapes for many types of disasters. In particular, the relative
location of the disaster area and subnetworks is not known.
Therefore, under no such prior information, the proposed
model is valid as a first-step approximation. However, for a
specific type of disaster, we may obtain information about
the disaster location. For such cases, an assessment method
for network survivability using such information is for further
study. In addition, the assumption of convexity of the ring-
type network and the assumption that no network elements
function in D are also first-step approximations. The results
under the relaxed assumptions for these assumptions will be
presented in the near future.
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